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ABSTRACT
The Zapatista Revolution that begun in January 1,
1994, led by the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion
Naci.onal, is the most recent resurgence of an age-old 
conflict in Mexico: indigenous and poor people's struggle 
against Mexico's powerful elite. The Zapatista rebels 
have been notable for their excellent media management 
skills and their use of new technology to disseminate
their message.
This thesis will'study the rhetoric of this
contemporary revolution-turned-social movement, by using
cluster analysis. It explores the use of rhetoric of
confrontation and rhetoric of peace to further the
Zapatista cause, seeking to identify any changes in their
message during the last ten years of the revolution.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTORY CHAPTER
Introduction to Topic
On January 1, 1994, the Zapatista Army of National
Liberation (EZLN) formally declared war against Mexican
president Carlos Salinas de Gortari and the Federal
Government, demanding "work, land, housing, food, health,
education, independence, freedom,'democracy, justice and
peace" (Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, translation
mine). Before the Mexican Government could begin
operations to crush the rebel forces, the Zapatista
declaration of war had circled the globe via the Internet,
and the word focused on Chiapas through the eyes of the
countless journalists, activists, and international
organizations that wrote the stories of this uprising in
articles and emails, and who introduced Subcomandante
Marcos, a new revolutionary icon and first spokesperson
for the EZLN.
Since the EZLN's formal declaration of war, the
Mexican government, the Mexican people, and others all
over the world have speculated as to the origins.of the
1
EZLN and the identities of the revolutionaries. Who are
the masked women and men who call themselves Zapatistas?
"The men and women of the EZLN, the faceless ones, the
ones who walk in the night and who belong to the
mountains, have sought words that other men and women
could understand" (Harvey, 1998, p. 6). The EZLN has
never given specifics about how their Army originated.
When masked Zapatistas are asked their names, they give
their Zapatista name, names adopted in the Lacandona
jungle. When asked their age, they respond with the
number of years of exploitation of, the indigenous people,
land and resources of Chiapas by the ruling class, over
500 years (Garcia Marquez, 2001). The Zapatista message
may come from the Comandancia General del EZLN, from the
first and primary spokesperson.Subcomandante Marcos, or
from the Comandante Susana, Comandante David, Comandante
Tacho, or Comandante Esther, all leaders in the Zapatista
Army who were a part of the Zapatista March to Mexico
City, March 2001 (Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion
Nacional, 2001). Marcos explains why the Zapatista
message should be delivered by so many voices: "So the one
2
who speaks is a more collective heart, not a single
leader, or caudillo" (Harvey, 1998, p. 7).
In the first hours of the new year, the Zapatista
Army took control of the Chiapas towns of Altamirano,
Chanal, Huixtan, Las Margaritas, Ocosingo, Oxchuc, and San
Cristobal de las Casas, where tourists, both Mexican and
foreign, were celebrating the beginning of a new year.
The new-year celebrations were cut short by the occupation
of the Zapatista Forces and the destabilization of the
municipal governments.' Top politicians were arrested by
the revolutionaries, rich and powerful landowners were
kidnapped, police officers were disarmed, Mexican citizens
and the international community were shocked by the news
of this uprising. This was a very untimely event for the
Mexican Federal Government given that January 1, 1994 was
the day the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)
was to take effect.
This is not the first time Mexico has experienced a
revolution. There has been protest and dissent in Chiapas
since its colonialization by the Spanish conquerors, more
than 500 years of opposition, from indigenous peoples and
peasants. Likewise, there has been torture and death for
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millions of peasants and indigenous people that have dared
to speak out against the abuses of the ruling class. This
conflict between the ruling class and the indigenous and
peasant poor has had a long life. Revolutionary fire has
been extinguished time and time again, only to resurge
decades later with renewed commitment. January 1, 1994
marked the most resounding resurgence of this conflict.
A Different Revolution
There are several factors that mark the difference
between past revolutions and the revolution led by the
Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional. These
differences make of the EZLN a very unique phenomenon as
far as armed revolutions go, they blur the line between
what we recognize as a revolutionary force and what we 
recognize to be a social movement. First, the Zapatista
message differs in significant ways from those of past
revolutionaries: there is no implied or overtly expressed
intent to overthrow the Mexican government through armed
conflict in order to take power; there is no implied or
overtly expressed intent to obtain, through force or
democratic election, political positions for the Zapatista
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leaders within the government; their message is broad 
enough to include the struggle of many other oppressed 
groups; and their call to action does not urge violence 
against the government from supporters, but, instead,
advocates for political and social action from the Mexican
people as well as international groups in support of the
oppressed in Chiapas. The Zapatistas speak of the extreme 
poverty much of Mexico's indigenous and peasant population
live in and demand justice and respect for all indigenous
I
people, however Subcomandante Marcos has made it a point
to clarify that the group does not claim to represent all
indigenous people of Mexico, though all oppressed people
are invited and encouraged to join the Zapatistas, whether
indigenous or non-indigenous, or create their own
revolutions.
Second, the Zapatistas effectively used, and continue
to use, the media to force on the international public
accountability for any additional atrocities we may permit
the Mexican government to commit against Zapatista
Chiapanecos. Especially, but not exclusively, the use of
the Internet, to disseminate- the message and continue
communicating the Zapatista side of the story to.the
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Mexican and international public considerably increased
the EZLN's chances for survival and decreased the
likelihood of mass murders of rebel troops and their
supporters by the Mexican Military. The speed in the
delivery of the Zapatista messages through the Internet
was crucial to the survival of the revolutionary group in 
the sense that it acted as the switch to the spotlight on
Chiapas. Upon learning of the events unfolding in
Chiapas, media, international organizations, and many
students and activists focused immediately on monitoring
all sides of the conflict. The military could not have
openly massacred Zapatista supporters or people suspected
of being Zapatista rebels without .intensifying
significantly the crisis already being faced by the
government (Ortiz, 2001, p. 12) .
Third, the fact that Mexico was a part of NAFTA
assured ample coverage of the Zapatista uprising by
American journalists. After all, anything that threatened
to destabilize Mexico and undermine the effectiveness of
NAFTA was a' threat to American interests, a promise of
future larger challenges of -various types and, most
certainly., economic troubles of global ramifications.
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NAFTA had a highly controversial path to passage in the
United States. It was feared that the treaty would 
threaten American jobs, threaten the environment, depress
wages, and further widen the gap between the rich and
poor, in the Unites States and in Mexico (Brecher, 1993).
Armed conflict in Mexican soil on the first day of NAFTA 
operation, January 1, 1994, was very bad news for both,
the Salinas and the Clinton administrations.
Fourth, the Zapatista Army used military action only
as a tool for calling attention to the plight of the
indigenous and peasant Chiapanecos. In many statements
and interviews given by Zapatista leaders, they have
stated that the Zapatistas do not want to remain an army.
Rhetorical strategies of violence is what attracted the
attention of the Mexican people and the people of the
world. It has served its purpose and continuing on the
path of violence would hurt the cause. It is through this
fourth distinction that the image of the EZLN has managed
to evolve from revolutionary army to social movement.
The Federal Government and the state government in
Chiapas have made declarations to discredit the Zapatistas
and the cause they espouse. The language and tone of the
7
government's story was forced to change, as the Zapatista
stories became the most talked about, written about, and
read about indigenous stories in the world. It was
exceptional and effective media management by the
Zapatista spokespersons that made the difference in the
government's ability, or rather inability, to vilify the
EZLN and Subcomandante Marcos.
Justification for the Study 
The story of how the Zapatista Army came into
existence, the make up of the revolutionary group, how the
Zapatista occupation of the seven municipalities was
conducted, and the Zapatistas' true goals, is different
depending on whom the questions are directed to. While
there are many stories that attempt to answer the above
questions, I will limit my analysis to addressing the 
following questions: 1) How do the Zapatistas use a 
rhetoric of violence in their literature? 2) How do the
Zapatistas use a rhetoric of peace? 3) How do they
justify the use of violence to promote and/or defend the
Zapatista cause? Only the texts originated and
distributed by Zapatistas will be used for this analysis.
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I will analyze the official comunicados of the
Zapatistas using cluster criticism. Cluster criticism is
a study method that involves the identification and 
charting of key terms within a selected text and the 
identification and charting of terms clustering around the 
selected key terms. The cluster terms and the layers of
meaning, or the power, they add to the key terms are then 
studied and the relationship between key terms and cluster
terms is defined. Through this method, we can obtain a
deeper understanding of the worldviews that are behind the
stories presented by the text being analyzed. "A cluster
analysis, then, provides 'a survey of the hills and
valleys' of the rhetor's mind, resulting in insights into
the meanings of key terms and thus a worldview that may
not be known to the rhetor" (Foss, 2004). I will analyze
the text of the Zapatista comunicados and identify the key
terms that appear in the justifications the EZLN has for
initiating armed conflict. Cluster criticism will help me
explore and identify those key terms that shape the
justifications the EZLN has for engaging in violence and
how these justifications have evolved in the ten years
that have passed since their first military action. Two
9
questions will guide my evaluation of the Zapatista
justifications for violence and the evolution of these
justifications: 1) Do the Zapatista justifications contain
elements of truth? Meaning, are their arguments based on
undeniable facts and information that is known to be true
by those directly involved in the conflict as well as
other publics? And 2) Considering the results of
Zapatista actions, was it ethical of the revolutionary
group to even attempt to justify confronting the Mexican
government and their military?
One important detail must be taken into account when
attempting to identify and understand the worldview of the
entity originating the story from the perspective of theI
Zapatistas, it cannot be assumed that the story is coming
from one specific individual or rhetor. The messages that
shape the Zapatista story have been delivered by different
representatives, through different media channels, under
various circumstances and, in some cases, the author is
not identified or a group of people is identified as the
originator of the message, not an individual. For this
reason, the worldview identified through this analysis
10
will be attributed to the organizational entity called the
Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional.
Thesis Overview
This thesis will contain a total of five chapters.
Chapter two will include a literature review that will
contain the base of knowledge from which this study is 
departing. It will provide readers with background and
historical information relevant to the subject of this
study. Chapter three will discuss' cluster criticism in
detail and explain its usefulness in this study. Chapter
three will also describe the process of clustering key
terms surrounding violence and the'Zapatista justification
for it. Chapter four will be the analysis chapter which
will discuss the relevance of the results yielded by the
clustering and charting of key terms. Lastly, chapter
five will explore the use of the rhetoric of violence and
the rhetoric of peace in social movements and compare
whatever findings cluster criticism has helped identify in
the Zapatista texts with what is known about other social
movements.
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CHAPTER TWO
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Introduction
In order to begin to understand the complexities of
the context in which the Zapatista uprising develops, we
need to have some basic knowledge about Mexico's political
and socio-political history. This chapter will provide a
brief historical background on Mexico, briefly touching on
Mexico's colonial past and focusing in on Emiliano Zapata,
whose name the current revolutionaries borrow; the Mexican
Revolution of 1910, which the current Zapatista revolution
echoes, and some background on more recent history.
Mexico—Historical Background
Mexico is a nation with a rich indigenous past that
is remembered and lionized when it can attract tourism or
provide low-cost labor alternatives for US multinational
corporations, and is ignored and neglected the rest of the
time. Since the arrival of the Spanish conquerors', the 
indigenous people of Mexico have been resisting and 
struggling against disease, torture, enslavement,
12
oppression and death. Millions of Mexican natives died or
were murdered during the conquest. The exploitation and
abuse of those who survived helped support Nueva Espana.
The country was ruled by Spain for centuries before the
war for Mexican independence in 1821. The "Guerra de
Independencia" may have meant independence for Mexico as a
country but it did not mean independence or a better life
for the indigenous people of Mexico. "The war for
independence was, in essence, a struggle between the-
economic interests of the Creoles—the Spanish families
that had settled in the New World—and the Peninsular—the
Spanish people sent from Madrid to govern the colony"
(Riding, 1985) .
Mexico experienced much unrest after the war for'
independence. Several wars were fought on Mexican soil
and uprisings continued to occur in various places of the
nation every so often. Porfirio Diaz, a veteran of a few
of Mexico's wars, led an armed uprising to take over the
presidency after loosing twice to Benito Juarez, the first
indigenous president of Mexico. Diaz took the presidency
from Sebastiano Lerdo de Tejada and ruled a total of 31
13
years, one term of 4 years and a dictatorship of 37 years,
through fraud and force.
The Porfiriato, how the times of Porfirio Diaz are
known, did little to help the rural families of Mexico,
which are primarily indigenous. Diaz industrialized
Mexico but led a corrupt government that not only allowed
but welcomed foreign interests into Mexico to exploit its
resources and its people. During his time, most of
Mexico's wealth- was in the hands of a handful of elites.
I
The middle class was hurting and encountering challenges
when attempting to access funding for small businesses and
other entrepreneurial activities. The rural poor were
being robbed of their land and exploited by the rich
landowners they worked for; the poor had no legal recourse
to protect them so there was nothing they could do about
the abuse. The urban poor were exploited in the factories
and other businesses, many times being paid less than a
foreign worker (Riding, 1985).
The majority of the problems I just outlined remain
true today, and they are not exclusive to Mexico or to
developing countries. We can see some of these same
problems in the United States if we pay attention to what
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goes on around us: legal cases against Wal-Mart, luxury 
vehicles and limousines running on traffic-packed
Hollywood freeways and, just under or to the side of the
freeway, a.homeless family and a grocery store cart
containing their belongings.
Social discontent grew and the Revolution of 1910
erupted. One revolutionary leader, Emiliano Zapata, was a
strong protagonist of the national drama. He was and
still is a revered national hero for his important role as
a revolutionary, fighting against the Diaz dictatorship. 
The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional adopted his
name; they too fought against a dictatorship.
The Mexican Revolution forced Diaz into exile and
brought in reforms that were aimed at helping the rural
poor. There was to be a redistribution of- land and the
return of the stolen lands to their rightful owners but,
not much happened until much later, when President Lazaro
Cardenas took office. He is known for following through
with the redistribution of land that had been promised by
the Revolution.
It is difficult to pinpoint when or where it was that 
the Revolution reform was. lost or pushed aside and the
15
leaders in Mexican government fell back into corruption
and protecting the economic interests of the rich and
powerful. Perhaps, once revolutionary leaders and their
allies came into power, they saw the need to protect
themselves and their status. The case is that
revolutionary ideals became only political campaign 
material, to be used and abused passionately while
addressing the masses but never implemented or enacted.
Much like the concepts of freedom, equality and democracy
are used today by many of the political elite in our own
country, while they push the Patriot Act, do away with
Affirmative Action, and adopt policies that curtail our
rights and freedoms.
Recent History—Rebirth of Zapatistas
The Ejercito’Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional, as a
group, takes its first revolutionary action in Chiapas.
Chiapas, more than any other state in Mexico, has a
population that is deeply impoverished though they live
and work in one of the states that is richest in natural
resources. The living conditions of the majority of
Chiapanecos, mestizo and indigenous, continue to.be the
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worst in the nation. While all indigenous groups in
Mexico suffer poverty, discrimination and marginalization,
those living in Chiapas suffer some of the most severe
conditions. "Approximately 41% of children in this region
suffer from malnutrition and about 45% of men and 54% of
women have not completed primary school" (IDEX, 2004) .
Meanwhile, the state resources are bled for national use
and for exports. Chiapas supplies the rest of the country
with many important resources. "Today, Chiapas is almost 
an internal colony for the rest of Mexico, providing oil,
electricity, timber, cattle, corn, sugar, coffee, and
beans, but receiving very little in return" (Collier,
1994). This situation of extreme poverty is the basis for
one of the key arguments of the Zapatista army in their
declaration of war against the Mexican government. It is
because their people have nothing to loose, no homes, no
food, no schools, no hospitals, no future, that they, the
EZLN, must rise up and take action. The reasoning is
that, their people are dying without a fight, they might
as well die fighting. The modern Zapatista
revolutionaries are not the first to articulate their
reasons for fighting in this way; Emiliano Zapata once
17
said "it is better to die on your feet than to continue
living on your knees."
In Mexico's history we can also see that this is not
the first time the Federal Government has encountered
resistance from the citizens. This just happens to be the
first time Government and Rebels have had use of the word
and the communication channels on, almost, equally
powerful terms, one through the use of the Internet and
another through its continued use of Mexico's media. "The
Zapatista rebellion•can be seen as the latest in a long
cycle of popular demands for dignity, voice, and autonomy.
The novelty is to be found in the democratic discourse
that articulates a broad range of demands, from access to
land to peace, justice, and independence" (Harvey, 1998).
The poor economic conditions that affect the indigenous
people of Chiapas are not exclusive to this state.
Indigenous groups from any region in Mexico find
themselves in very similar circumstances.
Historically, to speak of the Mexican government is
to speak of authoritarianism and a dictatorship led by a 
single political party, the Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI), instead of a single dictator. This
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single-party dictatorship lasted for 71 years, from 1929
to 2000. Recent years have seen a dramatic political
change, with the fall of the PRI and the entry of Vicente
Fox Quezada, from the Partido de Accion Nacional (PAN),
into the presidency.
During the 1960s and 1970s, Mexico experienced much 
political turmoil. Student activism was strong. Public
I
demonstrations against the Federal Government strongly
demanded social change. The Mexican Federal Government's
response to citizen activism was swift and violent. The
decades of the 60s, 70s and 80s were the dark years of
what is known as the "dirty war," during which more than
500 Mexican student activists disappeared or were
murdered. To this day, hundreds remain missing (Ortiz,
2001; Poniatowska, 1971).
The victory of Vicente Fox Quezada in the national
elections of 2000 was supposed to ,mark a period of deep
change in the federal government of Mexico and the country
as a whole. For many, the entrance of Fox into office was
seen as a positive event in Mexican politics. It brought
people hope that democratic elections could actually take
place in Mexico (Chacon, 2000). Fox's victory also
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brought concern to those.in the liberal side of the
political spectrum. Fox is a man of socially conservative
background and close ties to the Catholic Church. His
political party, the Partido- de Accion Nacional (PAN), is
also known for being conservative.
Fox's entrance into the presidency presented a threat
to the future of women and minorities, especially. The
PAN has historically fought against left wing activism as
it pertains- to almost every issue: abortion, women's
rights, indigenous rights, GLBT rights, environmental
laws, etc.
The Mexican government, for centuries, has been a
government that displays blatant authoritarianism and
corruption. Until recently, Mexico was led by men who
shamelessly claimed to have been elected through a
democratic election process when it was evident that fraud
had been involved in getting them into office. Keeping 
the illusion of a Mexican democracy alive has always been
good for the interests of the ruling class. The message
of a democratic Mexico was used abundantly and repeatedly
during the 71 years of rule by the PRI. This political
situation has been common in almost all sectors of the
20
Mexican government, from elections of government officials
at the municipal level to elections of federal government 
officials, including, as mentioned, the elections for the
Mexican presidency.
With this level of widespread corruption, it is no
wonder that the PRI remained in Los Pinos, the official
home of Mexican presidents, for 71 years. It is important
to note that corruption and abuse of power has not been
exclusive to the Partido Revolucionario Institucional
(PRI). More often than not, corruption has had a specialI
place in all political parties, the institutions that
finance these political parties, and the government-
operated and government funded groups that support the
political and financial system of the country. This
discussion likely brings to mind memories of Enron and
WorldCom, and, no doubt, the very serious problems of
voter disenfranchisement and other forms of election
manipulation and fraud-in the state of Florida.
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CHAPTER THREE
METHOD AND SOCIAL MOVEMENT THEORY
Introduction
Social movements and social protest cannot be
conceived without consideration of the rhetorical
dimensions involved in the growth, maintenance, and
eventual decline or complete transformation and rebirth of
a movement. It is through the effective use of rhetorical
I
tactics that those struggles and ideals shared by
individuals can find an echo in the consciousness of many 
others and move large numbers of people to action,
transforming individuals into the driving force of change. 
As Andrews explains, "[t]he exciting, and frustrating,
characteristic of a movement is that it moves, and what
makes it move, in large measure, is the way language is
manipulated to control or interpret events" (Andrews,
1980). It follows then, that the rhetorical competence or 
incompetence of those speaking in the name of, in support
of, or against a given movement, can affect the direction
this movement takes and/o’r its. possibilities for growth.
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Though the rhetorical tactics used for social protest 
are wide-ranging, this study will focus only on the use of 
confrontation and the justifications for the use of
confrontational and/or violent tactics to further the
cause of a social movement. Confrontation as a rhetorical
form has traditionally been viewed as crude violence and
coercion. As confrontational activities in social
movements were studied further, some scholars have found
that these so-called "violent and coercive" actions have
been, at important points in history, very successful and
crucial in bringing about the social change, at the local
and national levels, being sought by a movement.
Rhetorical tactics perceived to be violent or
confrontational, at times created the contrast necessary
to make peaceful rhetoric and peaceful action a much more
attractive option for those involved in the conflict.
Past research on confrontational rhetoric will be explored
further later in the chapter.
The Zapatista revolutionaries have made use of
confrontational rhetorical tactics that range from the
written word to a very well-known, though single, military
action. This study will focus on the written messages'
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created and distributed to the media by the Zapatistas.
Specifically, it will focus on the sections of those
messages that discuss confrontation with those in power
and Zapatista participation in confrontational activities.
Cluster analysis will be the method employed to identify
key terms used by the Zapatistas in their confrontational
rhetoric and the relevance of these key terms to the
justifications the Zapatistas may have for the use of
confrontational and violent tactics in their written
messages, as well as confrontational activities outside
the written word.
In this chapter, I will examine in further detail
cluster criticism as a useful method for rhetorical
analysis. I will also provide a base of scholarly
knowledge about social movements and social protest,
focusing on examples of the use of, confrontation as a
rhetorical form, and justifications for
violence/confrontation given in the rhetoric of previous 
American social movement leaders. Though the Zapatista
revolution originated in Mexico and has evolved in both a
Mexican and an international.context, American scholarly
conceptualizations of social movements and confrontational
24
rhetoric can be applied to the Zapatista revolution
because there are basic characteristics of social
movements and confrontation that transcend cultural,
ethnic, and national boundaries.
Cluster Criticism
Cluster criticism is a method used in rhetorical
analysis that requires the following steps: First, the
critic must select the text or artifact they will analyze
Second, the method requires that the critic identify and
chart key terms within the selected text. Key terms are
identifiable by, 1) how frequently they appear in the
artifact or 2) their intensity and significance to the
text. Intensity is determined by how essential the term
is to the overall message or argument presented by the
artifact. Once the key terms are identified, the critic
must also identify and chart those terms that cluster
around the previously selected key terms. It is assumed
that the cluster terms appear in close proximity to key
terms because they are related in some way to those key
terms. The cluster terms add layers of meaning, or power
to key terms.
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Based on the meaning added to key terms by the 
cluster terms, the critic can establish a relationship
between key terms and cluster terms so as to arrive at an
interpretation of the clusters found in the text.
According to Reid (2004), "[t]his process of clustering 
ideas gives evidence of the communicator's motive for the
rhetorical act or work" (Reid 2004, pp.81). The clusters 
will allow the critic to obtain a deeper understanding of 
the worldviews that are behind the stories presented by 
the text being analyzed. Cluster criticism can yield
valuable information about the reasoning of the different
entities that drive a social movement, taking us to a more
profound level of understanding of•leader-centered social
movements.
Examples of Cluster Criticism
Cluster analysis has been used by rhetorical critics
to study various types of artifacts. Kimberly Elliott
(2004) analyzed Enron's Code of Ethics using this method.
Elliott found that "[c]luster analysis of the Code reveals
Enron's consistent equation of legal requirements and
ethics" (Elliott, pp.94). She arrived at this conclusion
by studying the clusters surrounding the following key •
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terms: ethics, laws, The Company, and employees. Elliott 
noted that the words (laws, regulations, policies, and 
guidelines) surrounding the key term "ethics" had more to 
do with the legality of employee activities than with any 
moral duty or obligation to "do the right thing." The key 
term "laws" was surrounded by cluster words that indicated 
a required acceptance of the "laws" (compliance, 
commitment, and faithfully) by employees and warned of 
possible consequences for failure to obey "laws"
(violation, abuses, and consequences). The terms
clustering around "The Company" were positive (respected, 
important, and excellence) while the terms surrounding 
"employees" placed employees in a context of possible
misconduct (violate, illegal behavior, and failure to
comply).
Kathaleen Reid (2004) also used this methodology to
study a painting by Hieronymus Bosch. Reid focused her
analysis on the design elements in the painting, including 
the artist's use of color, and used these design elements 
to conduct the clustering. Certain images surrounding 
those that had been identified as "key terms," were 
identified as cluster terms because of the frequency with
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which they appeared in the painting or because of how
central they were to the painting as a whole. This 
particular use of cluster analysis is not common, but
Reid's analysis served to raise additional questions about
the usefulness and applicability of cluster analysis when
analyzing visual communication. This example is presented 
only for the purpose of showing different ways in which
cluster criticism has been used in the past.
Cluster Criticism Applied to Zapatista Messages
My use of cluster criticism will be more along the
lines of Elliott's (2004) analysis. I will analyze the
text of the Zapatista messages and identify key terms
relating to the rhetoric of confrontation used by the
Zapatistas. Cluster criticism will help dissect the
Zapatista texts and make sense of those key terms that
define the confrontational nature of the relationship
between the EZLN and the Federal Mexican Government, as
presented by the Zapatistas. Confrontational rhetoric has
played a key role in shaping the identity of the EZLN as
an organization and also in facilitating the
identification of members of.the general public with a
broader Zapatista social movement, a collective of
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individuals which both supports the EZLN's push for change 
and brings to the table additional revolutionary fire that 
is specific to the oppression suffered within the
communities of the members involved in the movement.
Throughout my analysis, I examined texts for any
indications that confrontational rhetorical tactics and
the justifications for their use may be different in a
Mexican context as compared to the American context, since
there are significant historical, socio-political and
socio-economic differences between the two countries.
Introduction to Social Movement Studies
There are many layers of knowledge that make up
current understanding of the phenomenon we call "social
movement." In 1970, Herbert W. Simons combined concepts 
presented by others scholars to arrive at the following
definition for what we label "social movement:" "an
uninstitutionalized collectivity that mobilizes for action
to implement a program for the reconstitution of social
norms and values" (Simons, 1970). Though many of the most
notable social movements (Civil Rights Movement, Student
Movement, and Anti-war Movement) have been aimed.at
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achieving the goal outlined by Simons' definition, social 
movements may also mobilize to prevent others from
effecting change in the established system.
Leader-centered Social Movements
In order to build a base of knowledge for
understanding confrontation as a rhetorical form, I will
present some important conceptualizations of social
movements. Simons (1970) presented a leader-centered
approach to understanding social movements. He understood
movements to be made up of many leaders and, it follows,
that these leaders would have their own separate
followings, their own rhetorical tactics, their own
understanding of the "movement," and their own choices of
action, differing at various levels from each other.
Simons explains that leaders of organizations, and also
leaders that rise within social movements, have certain
rhetorical requirements they must fulfill: 1) attract,
maintain, and mold followers, 2) work to obtain acceptance
of movement ideals by the larger structure, and. 3) react
effectively to resistance from the larger structure.
Social movement leaders also-face what Simons calls
"rhetorical problems" that they must overcome. Of the six
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problems Simons lists, the most important today, because
of the potential to reach millions through media coverage
and the internet, is. the need for the leader to adapt to a
wide range of audiences. The leader's words, though she
may be addressing her group of followers, may now reach
millions of other people she may not have intended to
reach, thereby running the risk of positively or
negatively affecting the environment in which her movement
unfolds. Her words may serve as a wake-up call and set
into motion the activism of the opposition much quicker
than if she had only reached her supporters.
Identifying a Movement
Simons (1970) identifies three basic rhetorical
strategies in social movements: moderate, which is
sensitive to audience requirements, militant, which uses
confrontational tactics to achieve goals based on the
assumption that there is a "fundamental clash of
interests" (Simons, 1970) between those in the social
movement and those in power, and intermediate which blends
both strategies as needed. Simons concludes that, "[t]he
great leaders (and the great■ movements) seem capable of-
combining these seemingly antithetical strategies without
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inconsistency by justifying their use with appeals to
higher principles" (Simons, 1970). Based on Simons
understanding of social movements, we can assume that
militant and intermediate rhetorical strategies both use 
confrontational rhetorical tactics, while moderates may or
may not use these tactics. Some scholars of
confrontational rhetoric in social movements have studied
whether confrontation only plays a limited role in social
movements and whether it is only used as a tool by groups
or leaders when and where it is needed. Their
contribution to understanding confrontational rhetoric
will be discussed in more detail in the next section.
Social movements identified as confrontational are
identified as such because they are a force confronting
the established societal structure, values and beliefs.
Depending on the type of rhetorical tactics used and the
level of change being sought, people, especially those in
power, may perceive movements to be too radical and a
threat to traditional values. In studying social movement
rhetoric, Scott (1973) identified what he calls a
"conservative" voice in the arguments presented by the
leaders of some social movements. Scott understands the
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rhetoric of social movements to arise from the following 
pattern: "people experience division as oppression, seek
fresh identifications, find dominant groups hypocritical,
and, in responding to hypocrisy, sound a conservative
voice" (Scott, 1973). From Scott's perspective, what is 
radical about some social movements is not that they are 
confronting traditional values, it is that they are
confronting society's hypocrisy. Scott uses the
traditional value of self-determination and the rhetoric
of Stokely Carmichael, which was viewed by many, including
other civil rights leaders, to be too radical, to prove
his point.
'We shall have to struggle for the right to
create our own terms through which to define
ourselves and our relationship to society, and
to have these terms recognized,' Stokely
Carmichael argued. Why should the Black define
himself in terms of white values? Or the woman,
in terms of male values? Or the homosexual, in
terms of heterosexual values? (Scott, 1973)
Carmichael's words speak of the importance of self-
determination and the struggle that lies ahead to define
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the self and have this definition recognized by others.
Scott identifies the concept of "self-determination" as a
traditional value and, when defined as such, Carmichael is
embracing a traditional value and the only radical thing
he is doing is bringing society's hypocrisy out in the 
open. It is understood that Carmichael lived in a society 
that valued self-determination but only as it related to
white males. Based on Scott's reasoning, Carmichael's
rhetoric is conservative and the movement it represents is
also a conservative movement.
I
Confrontation and Social Movements
Cathcart (1978) claims that: "movements are a kind of
ritual conflict whose most distinguishing form is
confrontation" [emphasis in original] (Cathcart, 1978).
Confrontation is a defining factor in recognizing where a
social movement exists. In Cathcart's conceptualization
of social movements, if there is no confrontational
rhetoric, there exists no movement at all. He identifies
what he calls "two fundamentally different forms of
rhetoric—one which [he] calls managerial and the other [he
calls] confrontational" (Cathcart, 1978) . The rhetoric of
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true social movements falls under the "confrontational"
category. Cathcart explains that rhetorical forms which
only aim to adjust the existing order, not to reject it, 
are managerial and not confrontational. This reasoning
supports his claim that "reform" movements cannot be
considered true movements.
Some scholars agree that the rhetoric of
confrontation is an integral part of a social movement
(Andrews, 1980, Scott & Smith, 1969, Stewart, 1997, Tonn,
1996). Scott and Smith (1969) argue that it is the sense
of division or "radical division" in society what makes
confrontational tactics such an essential part of social
movements. "Those oh the "have-not" side of the division,
or at least some of their theorists and leaders, no longer
accept designation as an inert mass hoping to receive what
they lack through action by the "haves" (Scott & Smith,
1969). This state of division is what eventually ignites
the need to confront the established structure and those
in power. From Scott and Smith's 1969 understanding of
confrontation and its tie to social movements, we can
deduce that social division is the.source of the
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discontent that gives rise to confrontation and,
therefore, to social movements.
Confrontation and Its Uses
Scott and Smith believe that confrontation is used
both as totalistic strategy and non-totalistic tactic.
According to Scott and Smith, confrontation as a
totalistic strategy provides radical activists with a
strong sense of success because, in their understanding of
the world, "one has no where to go but up... after having
suffered for so long, he deserves to move up" (Scott and
Smith, 1969, p30). Confrontation 'as a non-totalistic
rhetorical tactic does not go as far as advocating for
radical measures or complete dismantling of the
established system. The rhetors and followers involved
recognize the usefulness of confrontation and try to use 
it only as far as it helps further their cause, careful
not to abuse confrontational tactics and kill all
possibilities for reaching at least some of the goals
being sought by the movement. The level of division that
is perceived by the' individuals involved in the movement
seems to affect whether confrontation will be a totalistic
strategy or a non-totalistic tactic for the group.
36
Radical activists expressing a need for more violent or 
forceful confrontation to bring about social change tend
to see a more "radical division" in their world and
typically use confrontation as a totalistic strategy.
Scott and Smith (1969) discuss confrontation and
social movements in a similar light as Gregg (1971) . They
concur that the social movements are rhetorical exchanges
different from any other and confrontational rhetoric can
include various types of communication and actions, 
including those that some critics'discount as violence and 
coercion: massive marches and rallies, media/speech
campaigns attacking, ridiculing and embarrassing those in
power, sit-ins, and other acts directly challenging the
establishment. The authors of both articles examine the
deeper personal meaning and effect that the use of
confrontational tactics has on activists. Scott and Smith
devote a significant space to analyzing what they call the
symbolic "rite of the kill," which, the authors claim,
serves activists primarily as a way to release a
psychological burden carried as a part of their
oppression. "To satisfy the. rite that destroys the evil
self in the act of destroying the enemy that has.made the
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self evil, the radical may work out the rite of kill 
symbolically" (Scott and Smith, 1969, p29).
Confrontational forms that ridicule, embarrass or
otherwise damage the enemy's image, symbolically kill the 
perceived enemy.
Scott and Smith also direct attention to what may
attract activists to confrontation: "Part of the
attraction of confrontation is the strong sense of
success, so strong that is may be ,a can't-lose strategy"
(Scott & Smith, 1969, p30). Logically, having a strong
I
sense of success fulfills an activist's personal need and
is bound to encourage individuals to be strongerI
participants in a movement. Similarly, Richard Gregg sees 
confrontation as a strategy that can fulfill certain
psychological needs of those involved in a social
movement. According to Gregg, confrontational or protest
rhetoric has an ego-function. He affirms the view that
this rhetoric is primarily directed to the activists
themselves. Gregg adds that protestors "feel the need for
psychological refurbishment and affirmation" (Gregg, 1971,
p47), which is obtained through the use of confrontational 
tactics that damage the enemy and the system. Gregg
38
suggests that the position of oppression from which social
movement activists unleash their protest rhetoric,
provides them with four advantages: 1) helps the movement
maintain its distance from the enemy since the rhetoric
makes clear who is a part of the oppressed class and who
is a part of the oppressor class 2) facilitates symbolic
control for the activist, it is the activist who defines
the situation, 3) generates attention or fear from the
enemy, Gregg goes as far as to suggest that some level of 
respect can also be gained by the activist, and 4) the
confrontational qualities of the activist rhetoric can
provoke a reaction from those in power that, though it may
be ugly, can also be "ego-gratifying" to some (Gregg,
1971) .
Confrontational Rhetoric in Action
In the last century we have seen several social
movements that have had a tremendous impact on the nation
as a whole. One of the most momentous of the movements of
this century has been the Civil Rights Movement. The
Civil Rights Movement made invaluable contributions to our
country and to our culture, no doubt, but in terms of
confrontational rhetoric and rhetoric of protest, "[t]he
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civil rights movement has generated perhaps the widest
range of new forms [of protest]" (Haiman, 1967, pll) .
Haiman highlights the extension of protest rhetoric to
other, non-traditional arenas, by the Civil Rights
Movement, to support his assertion.
During this era of American history, the Civil Rights
Movement was not the only source of creative
confrontational tactics. The Anti-War Movement and the
Student Movement were also rich sources of new
confrontational forms of action. "With respect to the
Vietnam war, we have witnessed everything from vigils, to
sit-ins at draft boards, and picket signs accusing the
president of murder, to the burning of draft cards and
self-immolation" (Haiman, 1967, pll). The Student
Movement activists also conducted their share of sit-ins,
marches, rallies and the like. Andrews (1980) presents
his analysis on the confrontational rhetoric used by
Students for a Democratic Society (SDS), a student
organization at Columbia University, where SDS organized a
radical student voice to speak out on two issues: 1) the
construction of a gymnasium and 2) the future of the
University's relationship with the Institute for.Defense
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Analysis. Andrews presents SDS and their actions in a
very negative light, in part because of the polarized 
meaning he has given to the two types of rhetorical 
strategies he identifies: coercive and persuasive. It is
clear in Andrews' writing that coercive rhetoric is
perceived as negative while persuasive is perceived as
positive. The incidents at Columbia University involved
demonstrations, sit-ins and ample use of attacks against
those in power at the university, amongst other
activities.
Unigue Example1 of Confrontational Rhetoric
The next example of confrontational rhetoric in
action is interesting and very significant because of the
gender of the leader and the status of women at the time
when she took on the leadership role. Pre-women's
suffrage and Women's Liberation, one particular female
social activist did a phenomenal job at leading male, and
a few female, coal mine workers in their fight for fair
wages, and improved working conditions. Her name was Mary
Harris "Mother" Jones and her effective use of symbolic
motherhood granted her the absolute license to agitate and
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lead in the labor movement at a time when women in general 
were outright rejected by labor unions.
Tonn (1996) claims that what made "Mother" Jones so
successful and well accepted by the men she was leading 
was her ability to convincingly perform her part as 
symbolic mother and juggle all of the contradictions of
"motherhood":
Indeed, Jones' embodiment of motherhood reveals
that caregiving and its "ethic" is always a
complex balance of multiple polarities:
authority and independence, holding and letting 
go, tenderness and fierce protection, mercy and
justice, emotion and intellect, expressiveness
and instrumentality, tolerance and tough-
mindedness, and so on (Bernard 348-365; Dow and
Tonn 297, Ruddick 108). (Tonn, 1996, p423)
Most social movement studies and theory I reviewed was
been leader-centered. This is probably because the
majority of social movements have had easily identifiable, 
predominantly male, leaders. Campbell (1973) makes some
key points about the twist Women's Liberation rhetoric
brings to our understanding of social movement rhetoric.
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In the case of Women's Liberation, finding a male leader 
would have been a challenge. As a matter of fact, finding 
any leader, female or male, was a challenge. Women's 
Liberation is unique and positively untraditional in many 
ways. Campbell (1973) analyzes the rhetoric of Women's
Liberation as a rhetorical genre not as a movement. She
asserts that Women's Liberation is not a movement and her
observations on the uniqueness of 'Women's Lib rhetoric is
valuable and insightful.
The Women's Lib rhetoric is confrontational by
definition: one cannot be accepted as a woman and seek
liberation from societal norms. Women involved in Women's
Liberation seek to be something other than what their role
as "women" prescribes "they attack the fundamental values
underlying this culture" (Campbell, 1973) . These
circumstances consequentially make of the rhetoric of
Women's Liberation a radical rhetoric, with no choice to
be otherwise. According to Campbell, the most distinctive
stylistic features of Women's Liberation are: 1) having an 
"anti-rhetorical" style of communicating, in other words,
the rhetoric displays tentativeness or utter refusal to
anoint a specific leader for women's causes, it exhibits
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no intention of finding a single path for furthering 
women's many causes nor is there an organized push to 
obtain a commitment for Women's Lib actions, and 2) having 
a general preference for conducting "consciousness
raising" meetings as a communication strategy. These 
meetings are markedly different from the typical meetings
held by social activists of other movements in that there
are no leaders of the discussion and there is a high
interest in each participant's personal experience, these
meetings are more individual-focused than they are
movement-focused. The importance,of Campbell's piece to
this study on Zapatista rhetoric lies in the absolute
confrontational quality of Women's Lib rhetoric. Women's
Lib rhetoric is highly confrontational because of the
nature of the struggle. Every argument and demand for
change brought about by Women's Lib went directly against
an oppressive system, a culture, and a society that
defends this oppressive system and culture.
Effects of Confrontational Rhetoric
Rhetoric scholars agree that confrontational rhetoric
is not always successful and-, in fact, many times it is
damaging to a movement (Andrews, 1980; Cathcart,.1978;
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Gregg, 1971; Haiman, 1967; Scott, 1973; Scott & Smith,
1969; Stewart, 1997). Burgchardt (1980) presents us with
an example of how damaging confrontational rhetoric can be
to a group advocating for change: the rhetoric of those
involved in American communism of the early 1930s and
their attempt to make significant changes to their
rhetoric later that same decade. So confrontational was■
the communist rhetoric of the early 1930s, Burgchardt
claims, that it alienated many possible supporters of it.
According to Burgchardt (1980), when American communists
attempted to tone down the confrontational aspect of their
message, they found it very difficult to undo the damage
they had done in earlier, more confrontational years.
Nevertheless, confrontational rhetoric was used by
American communist leaders to attempt to persuade others
to join their political party because they, like many
other movement leaders, had strong reasons to do so.
It is clear from past research that confrontational
tactics are very risky and even dangerous because of the
potential for damage they entail. Yet, they have been
used very successfully by some groups within the Civil
Rights Movement, the Labor Movement and other movements.
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All movements that use confrontational rhetoric have their
own, identity and situation specific, justifications for
using it. Amongst these justifications we can find some
commonalities. There are feelings on the part of the
activists that arise from having been subjected to
oppression, abuse, disrespect, and degradation by the 
established system and/or those in power. These feelings
alone may justify confronting the enemy, whether it is
through rhetorical acts or direct violence. "Enough!"
seems to be what confrontational rhetoric shouts at the
ienemy.
Conclusion
The pieces reviewed for this chapter were chosen for
their relevance to Zapatistas as a, revolutionary group
turned social movement and to their use of confrontational
rhetoric in their literature. As risky and dangerous as
confrontation may be, it has served, and continues to
serve, social movements in various ways. Confrontational
rhetoric:
1) .serves to create identification within the members
of the movement by clearly defining who the "we".is.
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2) it serves to mark the difference between movement
members from the enemy by enumerating his various flaws 
and exposing his evilness.
3) it provides a feeling of empowerment and success, 
whatever the response from the enemy may be. If change is
achieved, it was through the movement's power, strength 
and worthiness. If the enemy responds with direct
violence, the enemy has been unmasked and his violence is
evidence of his evil nature.
Confrontational tactics are meant to cause a strong
effect on people, whether they are activists of the
movement, neutral parties, or those in power. These
rhetorical forms are generally offensive to someone,
deemed too violent by some, or dismissed as too radical or
militant by others. .The movements mentioned in this
chapter have used a wide variety of tactics,
confrontational and non-confrontational, to achieve their
goals. At times, it has appeared to be that
confrontational tactics are the only form of interaction 
with those in power that will actually yield some results 
acceptable to those pursuing, social change. As the ruling
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class resists social change, confrontational rhetoric
seems to be indispensable to social movements.
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CHAPTER FOUR
ANALYSIS
Introduction
A decade has passed since the Ejercito Zapatista de 
Liberacion Nacional (EZLN) carried out their military
operation. This study is aimed at exploring these ten
years of revolution through the literature released by the
revolutionary organization EZLN, with the purpose of
answering the following questions: 1) How do the
Zapatistas use the rhetoric of violence or confrontational
rhetoric in their literature? 2) How do the Zapatistas
use the rhetoric of peace? 3) What justifies the use of
armed force to promote and/or defend the Zapatista cause?
In order to fully address these questions, I have used
cluster criticism as a method for identifying key themes
within the Zapatista messages.
Representatives of the Ejercito Zapatista de
Liberacion Nacional (EZLN), including Subcomandante
Marcos, other individual Comandantes, and the Comite
Clandestine Revolucionario Lndigena—General Command of the
EZLN, have collectively released over 450 documents and
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comunicados since January 1, 1994, the date they
officially made their presence known to Mexico and the
world. The documents and communiques of the EZLN, both 
original and translated versions, have been compiled and 
reprinted in books or re-posted on-line by writers in 
Mexico and the United States. These compilations, whether 
in hard copy or on-line, are important pieces because they 
document the vision, purpose and goals of the EZLN and
their armed uprising in the exact or translated words of
the Zapatistas themselves. Due to logistical limitations,
I could not locate all Zapatista documents and
comunicados, nor could I verify the exact number of
I
documents released by the Zapatistas.
After extensive research, I located several hundred
of these documents, more than 430, some reproduced in
English, Portuguese, German, French, Italian, and Dutch.
The majority of the documents are available in Spanish, 
their original language, though there are some that are
only available in English. Most of the 1994 documents
found in the unofficial EZLN website "Ya Basta!," for
example, were only available, in English but documents of 
later years are available in various languages, including
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Spanish. The webmaster, Justin Paulson, of "Ya Basta!"
explains that:
[T]he page began as a resource primarily for 
those outside of Mexico, and-in English; only in
1995 did the webmaster realize how much it was
being used from within Mexico itself, and since 
that time the dominant ianguage of the page has
gradually shifted to Spanish. (Paulson, 2001)
This may likely be the case of other websites too. While
there have been many studies using translated versions of
Zapatista documents and comunicados, I find that much can
I
be lost in the translation, potentially affecting the
conclusions of the analysis of these documents. In order 
to avoid the potential effect inaccurate translations may
have on a rhetorical analysis, I intend to conduct a
comprehensive examination of selected Zapatista documents 
and comunicados in their original language, Spanish. I
will provide my own translations of the sections of text
selected for the analysis as needed.
Due to these and other limitations in my research, I
selected the Zapatista texts.to be used in this study
based on:
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1) Their availability in their original language,
Spanish, for consistency.'
2) Their intended audiences, focusing on those
comunicados addressed to the Mexican people,
international publics, and specific organizations,
national or international.
3) Their exclusion of fictional stories and stories
I
involving the fictitious characters -created by
Subcomandante Marcos, such as Durito, a beetle
named "Nabucodonosor," who is well versed in
politics and economy. '
I elected to exclude documents and comunicados containing
fictitious stories and characters in order to avoid
confusing "Zapatista facts" with "Zapatista fiction." 
Though facts and fiction may be blended in some Zapatista 
documents, there are those documents that are unmistakably
short-stories (cuentos) or other w.orks of fiction and are
treated as such by the Zapatistas. Those works of fiction
are the ones that will be excluded.
From the hundreds of Zapatista documents found
throughout my research, I limited my analysis to fifty- 
four (54) documents (see Appendix A for list of texts by
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calendar year). The EZLN has not been consistent in the
release of their comunicados, some years they have
released no more than a few, some years they have released
over seventy (70). During my review of these documents, I
found they are very repetitive, repeating, rephrasing, and
repackaging the same messages time and time again, and saw 
it fit to narrow down my study by selecting only 5 or 6
documents per calendar year, with the exception of 2002
and 2004, and applying the three additional criteria,
mentioned earlier, to my selection process. An exception
I
in quantity of documents was made ,for 2002 (four
documents) and 2004 (one document)- due to limited document
availability. All translations of Zapatista text used in 
this chapter are my own (see Appendix B for the original
text, in Spanish, of Zapatista quotes).
This chapter contains the analysis and discussion of
the results yielded by the cluster analysis. I will
present my findings and explicate the relevance of these 
findings in providing answers to my research questions.
The research tool I used, cluster analysis, assisted in 
the identification of key themes in the Zapatista 
documents selected for this study. I have identified six
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key themes that appear throughout the Zapatista documents
of the last decade, 1994 to 2004. These themes are:
1. The theme of an "unjustified" or "unjust war,"
the war being waged by the Mexican Federal
Government and the powerful against the
indigenous and poor people of Mexico.
2. The theme of an "honorable" or "just war," the
war effort of the Ejercito Zapatista de
Liberacion Nacional (EZLIJ) .
3. The concept of an "unnecessary" or "pointless
death," the type of death being suffered by the 
indigenous and poor people of Mexico at the hands
of the powerful.
4. The concept of a "dignified" or "honorable
death," the type of death preferred by the
Zapatistas.
5. The theme of a "false peace," the "peace" being
enforced by the Mexican army by order of those in
power.
6. The theme of a "dignified peace," the type of 
peace being sought by the EZLN.
5' 4
As the messages build these six themes, I have found that
the Zapatistas use terms that assign certain character
traits to the parties mentioned in their comunicados. To
validate their assignments of character traits, the
Zapatistas include terms that describe or name specific
actions taken by the parties discussed in their documents.
For the remainder of this chapter, I will present my
findings in further detail, breaking them down into the
six themes listed above and then expanding on the
I
Zapatista use of character trait terms and actions terms
to support their claims.
Unjust War
The "First Declaration from the Lacandona Jungle" was
the first Zapatista document released to the world on the
night of December 31, 2003. It was a formal declaration
of war from the EZLN to the Mexican federal government.
This document established the basic arguments, claims and
demands set by the Zapatista revolutionaries. One of the
key claims presented to the Mexican people, and the world,
through this document was' that of the existence of an
"unjust war" taking place in Chiapas and throughout
55
Mexico, in many indigenous and poor communities. The 
"unjust war" theme is constructed through the many
communicados released between 1994 and 2004. The
Zapatistas claimed then, and continue to claim in later
documents, that this war is being waged by the Mexican
federal government and the powerful upper-class in Mexico.
It is a war that has "not been formally declared"
but, according to the Zapatista messages, has continued
through many years despite the absence of a formal
declaration from the Mexican government (Comandancia
General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de Leon (Ed.), p. 15). The
war coming from the Mexican government is different from
that being declared by the Zapatistas on January 1, 1994.
The government's war is an "unjust war." It is
"genocidal" (Comandancia General del EZLN, Ponce de Leon
(Ed.), 1994, p. 15), it is "mass murder" (Subcomandante
Marcos, 1995, p. 215), it is "ethnocide" (C'CRI-Comandancia
General del EZLN, Ponce de Leon (Ed.), 1995, p. 86).
This "unjust war" is carried out by the Mexican government
against the "Zapatistas" and the "Zapatista communities,"
terms that are surrounded by- character trait terms that
identify them as "the smallest, the always forgotten, the
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meat destined yesterday to die a death by diarrhea, 
malnutrition, being forgotten, in the coffee fields, 
properties/lands owned by the rich, the streets, the 
mountain" (Subcomandante Marcos, 1995, p. 217), in other
words, the Zapatistas and the families in communities are
innocent victims of a war that is unjustifiable.
The terms that cluster and help develop the concept
of an "unjust war" involve character trait terms that
define the Mexican government as the ruthless aggressor
that rules with "bloody hands" (Subcomandante Insurgente
Marcos,1996, Ponce de Leon (Ed.), 2001, p. 133, December
26, 1997, S119) . The Zapatistas speak of "criminals" and
"government" as being one and the same (see Subcomandante
Insurgente Marcos,1996, Ponce de Leon (Ed.), 2001, p.
132). It would be difficult for a reader to imagine that
a government, like the one described by the Zapatistas in
their documents, could conduct anything other than a
criminal and "unjust war."
The "unjust war" the Zapatistas inform the Mexican
people and the world about is carried out by the
government through various actions, including but not
limited to "harassment," "persecution," (CCRI-Co.mandancia
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General del EZLN, Internet, February 14, 1997) and 
"massacres" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Internet,
January 10, 1994, December 26, 1997) conducted, the
Zapatistas claim, by both the Mexican military and, much 
more frequently as time passed, by paramilitary groups
paid, trained, armed and protected by the Mexican Federal 
government (see Subcomandante Marcos, Internet, January 1,
1999) . We can identify in Zapatista documents a marked
increase in concerns posed by paramilitary groups from
1996 on. Though the concerns with the Mexican military
are not reduced, Zapatista texts notify the Mexican people
and international publics that poor communities in Chiapas
are being frequently, if not constantly, harassed,
threatened and/or attacked by these paramilitary groups
made up of locals recruited by the federal government (see
Subcomandante Marcos, Internet, Noviembre 7, 1997,
Diciembre 26, 1997, January 1998, January 1, 1999, May 10,
2000) . The way in which the Zapatistas present their
conceptualization of the Mexican federal government's
behavior toward the indigenous and poor communities in
Chiapas, and go on to extend- their claim to include 
situations occurring nationwide as additional examples of
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the "unjust war," creates the sense that defensive action, 
armed or otherwise, from those under attack is not only- 
justified, it is imperative for survival.
Just War
The concept of an "unjust war" is markedly contrasted 
with the concept of a "just war". In Zapatista ideology, 
a just war is one that is fought in self-defense or in
defense of those who are defenseless in the face of
injustice and aggression. It is also a war that is not
fought unless it is absolutely unavoidable, a "last
resort." Zapatistas explain:
We, free men and women of integrity, are aware that
the war we declare is a last resort but a just
measure. The dictators have been waging an
undeclared genocidal war against our peoples/villages
for many years, because of this, we ask for your
resolute participation supporting this plan of the
Mexican people that fight for work, land, housing,
food, education, independence, freedom, democracy,
justice and peace (Comandancia General del EZLN,
1994, Ponce de Leon (Ed.), p. 15).
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The Zapatistas claim they had no choice but to respond to
the aggressions their communities have been suffering for
years. They responded by using both, words and guns, 
taking military action against those in power and ensuring 
the dissemination of their message. It is important to
note that the initial imagery used by the EZLN to
conceptualize their "just war" changes with time and, we
can infer from Zapatista texts, with influence from the
responses given by national and international
organizations, Mexican civil society and international
publics to Zapatista messages. Throughout the Zapatista
documents we can find that, in the early stages (1994),
"just war" is discussed in terms of "armed struggle,"
"firearms" and "combat operations" (Comandancia General
del EZLN, 1994, 2001, p. 15; CCRI-Comandancia General del
EZLN, 1994, p.47) gradually shifting to an "armed but non­
violent struggle" and an "effort" to reach the same goals
they were attempting to reach, but now through dialogue
and peace talks: "a just and new Mexico," "dignified and
true peace," "respect for people's dignity," and "a new
way of doing politics with people," (Comandancia General
del EZLN, 1996; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1997;
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CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1999, Subcomandante
Insurgente Marcos, 2000) . Words gradually became their
primary weapon for waging their war against their enemy, 
not because the Zapatistas gave up their firearms but, 
because, according to the EZLN, the strong response from
Mexican civil society and international publics asking for
a non-violent approach needed to be listened to and
obeyed. The Zapatistas remained armed for their own
protection but remained militarily inactive. By 1998-99,
the Zapatistas had added a new weapon to their arsenal for
making "just war," silence. Zapatistas claim that the
power of their silence and its usefulness as a weapon of
war was discovered in much the same way as the power of
words was discovered in January 1994 (Subcomandante
Marcos, 1998). The key to understanding the value of 
silence as a tool for combating the enemy lies in that,
according to the Zapatistas, the enemy being fought is
powerful but his cause is not supported by reason or
justice (Subcomandante Marcos, 1998). Reason and justice
are highly valued by the Zapatistas so, it is no surprise
that they would believe that, the absence of these two in
the arguments and actions’ of the powerful is so glaringly
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obvious that 'they need not speak or point anything out to 
the Mexican people. Throughout this decade of revolution 
and war in Chiapas, the Zapatistas have used words and 
silence as their primary weapons of war.
The terms surrounding the "just war" theme, place the
Zapatistas as polar opposites of the Mexican federal
government and the powerful elite of Mexico. The
Zapatistas affirm: "On our side is moral authority and 
historical reason. On the government's side is only the
military might and the lies that some media disseminate"
(CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1995, p.337). While
the powerful are criminals and murderers, Zapatistas are
victims, the forgotten children of Mexico and Mexico's
defenders, the new heroes. The Ejercito Zapatista de
Liberacion Nacional announced to the world that theirs is
a war that is, not only just but, it is patriotic and
indisputably necessary for the good of Mexico. Love of
country, protection of the national flag, upholding of the
Mexican Constitution, and the invocation of national
heroes like Zapata, Villa and others, provide a romantic
touch to the image-building of the comunicados for the
Zapatista revolutionaries and their struggle. To continue
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along these lines, the Zapatistas affirm that their war is
supported by Article 39 of the Mexican Constitution, which
gives the Mexican people absolute ownership and control of
their country, as well as the right to choose who governs
Mexico and the inalienable right to change or modify their
government (see Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce
de Leon (Ed.), p. 14). The promise that Zapatistas are
willing to make the maximum sacrifice for the ideals and
values most Mexicans hold, sweetens the cluster of
positive character traits of the Zapatista even more.
Terms like "constitutional rights," "justice,"
"equality," are integral part of the Zapatista's "just
war" concept, whether the war is fought with fire arms or
words and political actions. The words "democracy,"
"justice" and "liberty" are the Zapatista signature and a
reminder of their demands. Those three ideals are
mentioned in relation to the Zapatista struggle in
virtually every Zapatista document I reviewed, whether
released in 1994 or 2004.
It is interesting to observe how what begun as a
declaration of war and ah execution of a military
operation, eventually evolved into a unilateral non­
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violent struggle to obtain the same original demands. The
Zapatista revolution is what sounds like an oxymoron, the 
"non-violent war" against a historically repressive and
oppressive government. Peace tactics are also tools of
war, a just and non-violent war.
Pointless Death
Death is discussed often in Zapatista comunicados and
it should be no surprise; with war and armed conflict
comes death. The EZLN chooses to ,acknowledge and speak of
many loses of lives, including the loss of those who have
died fighting for the Zapatista cause and those who have
died without fighting. Zapatistas discuss death in two
ways: 1) as a result of distinct circumstances and
specific actions, and 2) in spiritual terms, as a
transition into another form of life. Death for the
Zapatistas and their communities has been common place for
so long that their literature describes an interesting
relationship with death. They speak of a "death" that is 
with the indigenous and poor communities as if part of the 
family by us.ing the imagery of death "visiting" their 
villages, "sitting" at their tables, "staying" on their
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land, and lying in their beds with them (CCRI-Comandancia
General del EZLN, 1994, p.53; Subcomandante Insurgente 
Marcos, 1994, p.40). The Zapatistas link death to
government and power when describing the relationship
between the indigenous and poor communities of Chiapas and
the state and federal governments. They claim that state
and federal governments have delivered an unjust and
"pointless death" to their communities, for the benefit of
Mexico's powerful elite (see Subcomandante Insurgente
Marcos, 1994 and Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994, p.
40) .
Terms like "hunger" and "curable disease" appear
frequently when Zapatistas discuss "pointless death"
(CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994; Subcomandante
Insurgente Marcos, 1994). This type of death is perceived 
as "shameful," "undignified" and "senseless," according to 
the Zapatistas, for being so unnecessary and preventable,
and yet so ignored by those who govern and society at
■large (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995, p.190; Subcomandante
Insurgente Marcos, 1994, p.18; Subcomandante Insurgente 
Marcos, 1994, p.40).
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The "pointless death" theme supports the character 
traits the Zapatistas have assigned to themselves as 
victims and Mexico's forgotten children. It appears that 
their actions as an armed revolutionary group are
justified because it is in defense of the lives of
innocent people.
Honorable Death
To Zapatistas and their communities, dying quietly is
pointless and undignified, dying valiantly while fighting
for a better life is honorable and preferred.
We saw that is was wrong to die of grief and
pain, and we saw that it is wrong to die without
fighting, we saw that we had to earn a dignified
death so everyone could live, one day, with good and
reason. (Subcomandante Marcos, 1994, p.43)
Words that speak of "life," "dignity," "honor," a
"willingness to sacrifice" for the good of others, and
examples of these concepts, cluster around the theme
"honorable death." This theme goes hand-in-hand with the
"just war" Zapatistas are fighting.
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The EZLN presents the reader with a story about the 
life and death of poor and indigenous in Chiapas, under a 
government that seeks to exterminate them and a society 
that paid no attention for a long time. From the 
Zapatista perspective, responding to an "unjust war" with 
a "just war" and refusing a quiet and fruitless death to 
die a death that will bring about a new way of life is 
unquestionably honorable. Other revolutionaries have died
honorable deaths throughout history (Emiliano Zapata, 
Francisco Villa, etc.) and the Zapatistas identify
themselves with these heroes to support and promote the
acceptance of their "honorable death" theme.
False Peace
Peace is a condition that is difficult to define
because of its complexity. Understanding of peace can
range from a simple absence of disturbance to a condition
that would require the absence of all forms of violence
and proactive community-building and development of
cooperative relations between individuals and groups of 
people. In the case of the -Zapatistas, the peace they
demand is one of high complexity. Their peace requires
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"democracy, liberty and justice," nothing less (CCRI-CG 
del EZLN, 1995, p. 193). "We cannot accept a peace
without dignity" (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1994). The federal
government, entity that the Zapatistas have already 
branded as being "criminal," delivers mixed messages about 
peace. When observing what the federal government says
about "peace" and the actions that follow, it is clear 
that the Zapatistas and the Mexican government are looking 
for two very different forms of peace. Every Zapatista
I
document that discusses the Chiapas peace process,
presents the Mexican federal government as a liar and aI
I
fraud that "speaks of a political and legal solution [to
the Chiapas conflict], while their armies continue to
advance into the Lacandona jungle" (Subcomandante
Insurgente Marcos, Et. al ., 1995).
The Zapatistas declare that the Mexican government's
interest in a real and dignified peace is false (see
Comandante David, Comandante Felipe, Comaridante Javier,
Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos & Mayor Ana Maria, 1995).
They present their perspective on the "good intentions" of 
the Mexican government and the peace the government is 
looking for in terms of "lies," "acting as if" they want
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peace, "intention to trick," "intention to misguide,"
"intention to cover up" the war and destruction that the
government continues to take into the communities.
To the indications given by the Ejercito
Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional of their
disposition to find a political resolution to
the conflict, the federal government gave a two
faced response: while speaking of peace and
dialogue, they prepared a brutal military
strike. (C. David, C. Javier, Subcomandante
Insurgente Marcos & M. Ana Maria, 1995)
Thus, we have the theme of "false peace," which is the
Zapatista name for the type of peace offered by the
Mexican government to the poor people of Chiapas. This
theme serves to support the character traits already
assigned to the federal government by the Zapatistas. It
fits well with the image of a "criminal" and
"illegitimate" government. In addition to other
destructive activities, countless unresolved
"assassinations," "assassination attempts,"
"disappearances" and "massacres" are just some of the 
actions attributed to the Mexican government, while they
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claim to conduct thorough investigations and to continue
to seek peace (see C. David, C. Javier, Subcomandante
Insurgente Marcos & M. Ana Maria,■1995; Comandante David,
Comandante Felipe, Comandante Javier, Subcomandante
Insurgente Marcos, Mayor Ana Maria, 1995; Subcomandante
Marcos, 1998; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 2001;
Comandante David, 2001; Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos,
2004). The Zapatistas remind civil society that "the
government has the money and the power to make lots of
'peace' noise to drown out the sounds of war"
(Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 2001, p.229).
Dignified Peace
For the Zapatista, peace is linked to "dignity,"
"justice," "democracy," and "liberty" (CCRI-CG del EZLN,
1995). "Dignified peace" is a theme that permeates every
discussion about giving up their weapons and their "just
war." Ensuring a "dignified peace" for the Zapatista
communities, the indigenous and poor people of Chiapas is
one of the conditions that must be met before the
Zapatistas will consider leaving their armed rebellion.
The Zapatista's choice to put their life on the line in
70
order to achieve this peace was made before they came out
of the Lacandona jungle in 1994. This decision is made 
clear in the majority of the early comunicados. The 
Zapatistas acknowledge the support they have received from 
others for their struggle for a "dignified peace." They 
report that: "All who approached us came to offer help for
peace, for a peace that would not be like the one we had
before, for a new peace, like our comandante David says"
(Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1995) .
The complexity of a "dignified peace" in Zapatista
lands makes ultimate success almost unachievable in the
minds of the cynics. For others, the possibility, slim as
it may be, of achieving a "dignified peace" is enough to
commit to a lifetime of work for: "housing, land, work,
food, health, education, justice, independence, liberty,
democracy and peace" for the indigenous and poor people of
Mexico (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995).
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CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUDING CHAPTER
Introduction
I embarked on this project with three questions to
answer: 1) How does the Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion
Nacional use the rhetoric of violence or confrontation?
2) How do they use the rhetoric of peace? 3) How do they 
justify the use of armed force to promote or defend the
Zapatista cause? My research yielded six basic themes
used in Zapatista rhetoric: "unjust war," "just war," 
"pointless death," "honorable death," "false peace" and
"dignified peace." Through understanding what these six
themes mean to the EZLN and observing their construction
and use of these themes and how they were communicated to
their various publics, in terms of language and imagery
used, answers to my research questions began to surface.
In addition to understanding these themes and the
Zapatista messages, evaluation is also necessary. Two
most important measures of the quality of revolutionary
group the Zapatistas are, relate to the elements of truth
found in their literature and also to the ethics. behind
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their choice to carry forward an armed rebellion against a
much more powerful armed organization, the Mexican
military. This chapter is the final part of this thesis.
It will include a discussion about the answers to my 
research questions, evaluative analysis on the Zapatista
revolution, and teachings of this study. It will also 
present the limitations of my research and ideas for
future research on this topic.
Answers and Teachings
The Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional makes
ample use of the rhetoric of violence or confrontational
rhetoric throughout their documentos and comunicados.
They have used confrontational tactics at almost every
step of the way, conducting an aggressive media and speech
campaign to ensure their message was heard and
acknowledged at all levels of government and civil
society. This media and speech campaign fluctuated from
one year to the next, some years releasing under 30
documents, others releasing over 70. Through excellent
media relations, the Zapatis-ta's effectiveness at
attacking and ridiculing the government, as well, as
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denouncing most current crimes and aggressions suffered by
Zapatista communities, grew to impressive proportions.
In recent years, the Zapatistas have had longer
periods of silence than in others. In the first half of
2004, only one document has been released addressing civil
society and international publics. This year's silence is 
not surprising since silence has been used as a
confrontational tactic by the Zapatistas in the past;
refusing to participate in a peacemaking dialogue they
considered unproductive. For the EZLN, silence has been a
useful weapo'n in their "just war," though words have been
the primary and most powerful weapon of all. According to
the Zapatistas, the peace process has been stalled for
several years now because the Mexican government has not
fulfilled the three conditions for dialogue outlined by
the revolutionaries and agreed upon by the government
since before Vicente Fox Quezada entered the presidency.
The frequency with which the Zapatistas attended to
their media campaign against the Mexican government has
varied recently. Still, confrontational rhetoric remains
present in their comunicados-: 1) reminding Mexican civil
society of their existence and their struggle and 2)
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reinforcing the image and character traits of the Mexican
government by denouncing criminal actions committed by the 
government and/or the powerful of Chiapas, and by 
reminding civil society of the inaction or lack of 
interest of government officials in fully addressing the
conflict.
The Shift in Rhetoric
The rhetoric of peace became present very early in
the conflict. Within the first year, 1994, the tone of
the Zapatista revolutionary spokespeople went from talking
about their revolution in active, '"armed fighting" terms 
to include emphasis on the need for dignified peace and
encouraging active participation of the Mexican people and 
concerned international publics. The goals of this
rhetoric remained the same as those of the rhetoric of
confrontation but, this change only added a different
course by which to reach their audiences. Ultimately,
what rhetoric aims to do is connect the rhetor with others
so as to establish what Kenneth Burke calls a
"consubstantial" relationship.
A is not identical-with his colleague, B. But
insofar as their interests are joined,.A is
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identified with B... In being identified with B, A
is 'substantially one' With a person other than
himself. Yet, at the same time he remains
unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus,
he is both joined and separate, at once a
distinct substance and consubstantial with
another. (Burke, 1969, p. 20-1)
Carefully blended rhetoric of confrontation and rhetoric
of peace achieves a balance in message that can be much 
more palatable to the general public than an exclusively
confrontational rhetoric or exclusively peaceful one. An
exclusively confrontational approach would have caused the
Zapatista•uprising to be regarded as extremist or
terrorist, and would not have afforded them the protection
Mexican civil society and international publics provided
with their activism and their presence. An exclusively
peaceful approach would not have had the booming effect
that confrontation and direct action had in Mexico and
around the world; it would not have attracted the
attention of the revolutionary activists already tired of
facing death, even when working within Mexican law and
attempting to affect change through peaceful means. In
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Mexico, peaceful demonstrations have led to just as much
death as armed uprisings. For evidence of this, we need
only look back at the Tlatelolco massacre of 1968, where
hundreds of peaceful demonstrators, mostly students, were
murdered by order of the government. By using this
blended approach in the creation of their message, the 
Zapatistas achieved consubstantiaiity with a wider range 
of publics, both national and international, and even
those who did not agree that firearms were necessary to 
create change, sympathized with the Zapatista struggle.
The transition from justifying armed struggle to
justifying non-violent tactics occurred between 1994 and
1995, helping them expand their reach sooner. Note that
this transition took place early in the uprising and, in
large part, due to the tremendous involvement of civil
society and international support. The rhetoric of the
rebellion shifted from promises of violent response to
government attacks, to emphasizing Zapatista commitment to
a peace process and dialogue.
As the rhetoric of peace permeated more and more into
the Zapatista messages, justifications for the use of
armed force to promote of defend the Zapatistas became
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obsolete. It was clear that a large portion of Mexican
civil society was willing to consider the ideas presented
by the Zapatistas and even support those ideas and
advocate for their demands but, joining an armed
revolution and throwing the country into civil war was
likely not an option the masses were willing to take. The
Zapatista revolution, though armed, had become a non­
violent revolution within just a few months of public
existence. A reader can find plenty of justifications for
the use of armed force by the Zapatistas in their texts
but, direct justifications for their initial military
operation were given only in the early part of the
uprising. After that point, their reasons for taking up
arms were well known and, most importantly, with no
Zapatista combat operations to speak of, the
justifications for direct violence were expected much more
often from state and federal governments, who were
engaging in direct violence, than from the
revolutionaries. The state and federal government
sometimes attempted to justify the violent actions
perpetrated against Zapatista communities, and sometimes
attempted to deny that they had any involvement in them.
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Whether the government justified or not the direct
violence against Zapatista and indigenous communities, the 
involvement of the government and/or their military in
those operations was evident.
Uniqueness of Ejercito Zapatista de
Liberacion Nacional
The EZLN is unique in many ways but, one of the most 
noteworthy of all is their effectiveness at blending the
rhetoric of violence and the rhetoric of peace. This
skill is one of the reasons for their successes. Amongst
these accomplishments are, having been the only armed
revolutionary movement in Latin American history to 1) sit
down at the negotiation table with governmental
representatives that called them terrorists and
"professionals of violence," 2) be the first revolutionary
group to tour their country under the protection of
national and international groups and the Mexican people,
while remaining in defiance of the government, and 3) be
the first armed revolutionary group to address the
Congress of a nation while masked and in rebellion.
Subcomandante Marcos of the EZLN, who presents the
Zapatista blend of confrontational rhetoric and rhetoric
79
of peace, is an example of what Simons (1970) would call a 
"great leader." His skills in blending and alternating 
these rhetorical tactics make Marcos one of the best, when 
applying Simons' (1970) reasoning.
Another remarkable trait of the Zapatista revolution
is the observable commitment of the leadership committee 
to act within the guiding principles they espouse and
advocate for. There is harmony between what they say and
what they chose to do or not do. Their willingness to
listen to civil society and supporters, and to apply the
feedback they receive to their messages and actions, has
been a display of good will toward those that have shown
them good will. For example, "mandar obedeciendo" is one 
of the concepts the Zapatistas talk about when describing
the type of leadership Mexico needs. "Mandar obedeciendo"
translates as "to command obeying" which means to assume
command, to create laws and policies, but the commander
must do so while obeying the will of the people. In other
words, the people will tell you how you should govern, and
you, as a leader, must obey. By applying this same
concept and expectation to themselves, the Zapatistas
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retain a level of credibility and clearly mark the
difference between their enemy and themselves.
The shift in Zapatista rhetoric from advocating for
armed struggle to primarily advocating for social activism 
and direct peaceful action, indisputably worked to the
advantage of the Zapatistas. This shift in their rhetoric
is another unique characteristic of the Zapatista
revolution. It not only made them different from other
revolutionary groups in that they chose not to insist on
remaining engaged in armed conflict, it also helped them
increase their base of support, both nationally and
internationally. The Zapatista success cannot be measured
by the growth of their numbers because it is nearly
impossible to know for sure how many Zapatistas there
really are in Mexico and other parts of the world. Their
presence or absence from the media says nothing about the
activism and outreach being engaged in by Zapatista
supporters. Zapatista success cannot be measured by how
many hospitals, pharmacies, and schools have been opened
in Chiapas since their uprising, or how many lives have
been saved, or how many more people are literate now than
there were before, because Zapatistas do not control all
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of Chiapas. Considering the Mexico's history involving
revolutionary groups, their success can be measured, first
of all, by their effectiveness in ensuring their own
survival as a revolutionary group, secondly, by their 
positive effect in the areas of Chiapas where they do
retain control, and thirdly, by their willingness to
acknowledge their shortcomings and their commitment to
continue working toward Zapatista ideals.
Based on the criteria outlined here, the Zapatista
revolutionaries have been and continue to be very
successful. They are alive and working. They have had an
overwhelmingly positive effect on the autonomous
communities that are run by committees made up of
indigenous leaders: building new schools, increasing the
number of female students in their schools, creating
awareness in the community about the importance of female
involvement in civic life, amongst other things. Key
goals have not been achieved and Zapatistas and members of
the governing councils are the first to admit that things
are not where they intended for them to be, that equality .
and justice has not yet been- reached.
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We have not fulfilled all of the works we were
responsible for," one of [the members of the
governing council] apologized. "We did not
know, we were learning." One by one, the ten
members of the council who were leaving and the
ten that were preparing to take their places
spoke, the majority Tzetzal, and spoke of their
responsibilities to health, education, justice,
etcetera. (Bellinghausen, 2004)
Yet, there is still the strong sense of commitment and the
will to continue to move forward with their ideals.
Evaluative Analysis
Confrontational rhetoric in Zapatista messages and
comunicados served its purpose: to clearly identify the
revolutionaries, to mark the differences between these
revolutionaries and their enemy, and, lastly, to provide a
sense of empowerment to revolutionaries and their
supporters. Even when integrating rhetoric of peace and
advocating for peace talks and peaceful resolution to the
conflict, the Zapatista messages retained their
confrontational quality. The decade that has passed since
the Zapatista uprising has seen significant successes for
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the revolutionary group: a surge of national and
international attention and support, the creation of a new 
revolutionary icon in Subcomandante Marcos, the well-
publicized Zapatour of 2001, the unprecedented address to
the Mexican congress, and the creation of the Caracoles
(autonomous, indigenous-run communities) in Zapatista
territory. Still, indigenous people continue to die the
same types of deaths as before. Indigenous and poor
people, especially the women, suffer the attacks supported
by the local and federal governments and perpetrated by
the military or paramilitary groups in the area (Amnesty
International, 2002; Various Organizations, 2004) .
Families continue being displaced from their lands and
forced to take refuge in the jungle or migrate to other
towns. Communities are denied clean drinking water and
medications are not readily available for many. The list
goes on and on but it would be grossly unfair to expect a
small group of revolutionaries leading a twenty year old
revolution to right the endless wrongs that have been
committed and replace a system of oppression that has been
in place for more than 500 years. The powerful have had
the opportunity to perfect their system while the great
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majority of the poor and the indigenous have only had the
opportunity to die while serving it.
Preventable death has been ever present in indigenous
and poor Mexican communities for centuries and this has
not been by the choice of those affected. When the
Zapatistas describe the reality of their people, the
malnutrition, the lack of educational opportunities, the
absence of medical care, the childhood deaths, the
childbirth deaths, the limited opportunities to life, they
speak with truth supporting their claims. The facts
Zapatistas present about the problems their communities
face every day and the extreme levels of poverty they
suffer, can be found in reports prepared by organizations 
like Amnesty International and even those prepared by the
very government that does very little to address these
issues.
There is no question that the Zapatista cause is
legitimate. The arguments and the evidence they present
to support their decision to take up arms is compelling.
However, their enemy has a fully operating, well-armed and
trained military at their di-sposal and Zapatistas were
entering armed conflict with limitations that the Mexican
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military did not have. Many would question how ethical it
was for Zapatista revolutionaries to recruit young
indigenous people, men and women, to join a fight that,
for at least some Zapatista soldiers, ended up being an
offer to face a canon with only a rock to defend yourself
with. An armed uprising in Mexico would appear to be
nothing more than an open invitation for the military to 
commit mass murder. In spite of the risks mentioned,
young Chiapaneco men and women joined the ranks. Though 
deeply impoverished, their families helped feed their
Zapatista friends with what little they had. These same 
families risked their lives to help protect the Zapatista
soldiers during their first decade of existence and, much
more so, during the decade after. The only conclusion I
can draw from this discussion is that, death does not
discourage people from doing something if they've already
seen death up-close and personal throughout their lives.
Indigenous and poor Chiapaneco families were no strangers
to death. It may not have been ethical for Zapatista
revolutionaries to recruit local youth to risk their lives
in a revolution that would face such a powerful enemy, but 
it would not have been any more ethical for these young
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women and men to have died of curable disease, of
childbirth at age 15, nor of a gunshot wound during a
drunken fight or during a domestic abuse incident. The
Zapatista soldier's "honorable death" can seem much more
attractive than any other type of death. There is no
correct answer to the question of Zapatista ethics in this
revolution. To ask someone to take a peaceful approach to
stopping injustice when peaceful tactics have been met
with bullets in the past, is asking them to take a risk
equal to taking a weapon and fighting against injustice in
an armed rebellion.
Conclusion
This study of Zapatista literature contributes new
knowledge to social movement theory by studying the
literature of a modern revolution-turned-social movement,
in its original language, Spanish, to prevent losing parts
of their message in the translation and misunderstanding
the message. It is a study that looks at the birth and
rhetorical evolution of a social movement that takes place
in a different cultural and -social context than the
majority of social movement studies, which have focused on
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the American context and on the social movements of the
1960s and 1970s.
Limitations of Study
There are three important limitations to this study.
First, this study only focuses on a fraction of the
available Zapatista texts. Documents that would, or would
not, have provided additional insight were excluded
because they did not fit the guidelines created for this 
study, i.e. they were not available in Spanish or they 
were works of fiction written by the Subcomandante Marcos.
Second, time constraints and travel impediments did not
allow for more extensive research. I would have liked
additional time to find documents and video or sound clips 
that were of interest to me, like the transcripts of
Zapatista speeches or the sound clips of the Zapatista
radio programs and interviews, but were unavailable for 
review or difficult to access. Third, this study is 
limited to messages that are externally directed so, the
messages are not analyzed from a perspective that takes
into account what the Zapatista communities or Zapatista 
army may have thought of the- messages being disseminated 
on their behalf. I conclude that these messages, are
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mainly for external use because Indigenous Chiapanecos
belong to cultures that’ rely on oral transmission of 
messages in the form of stories. Many indigenous 
Chiapanecos have limited knowledge of the Spanish language
and depend on Zapatista translators to communicate
messages in their native tongue. In addition to the 
language differences, it is highly unlikely that a message 
to indigenous communities would be distributed in writing 
since much of the indigenous population has had no access
to education and, as a result, is illiterate. For these
reasons, friends and neighbors ard probably a much more 
widely accepted source of news.
Future research should explore Zapatista short stories 
It is in these stories that many sensitive and 
controversial subjects, like feminism, homosexuality and 
identity conflicts, are presented. It would be
fascinating to learn more about the use of these short
stories within the EZLN and their communities, considering 
that Mexican culture is very conservative and machista,
and indigenous cultures are even more so.
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Documents and Comunicados: 1994 to 2004
1994
1. Primera Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (January 1,
1994)—nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
2. Muriendo Para Vivir (January 6, 1994)—nuestra arma es 
nuestra palabra
3. Quien debe pedir perdon y quien debe otorgar?
(January 18, 1994)—nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
4. 500 Anos de Resistencia (February 1, 1994)—nuestra 
arma es nuestra palabra
5. Segunda.Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (June 10,
1994) —nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
6. La Guerra Viene Tras la Mentira (September 4, 1994)— 
EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2
1995
1. Tercera Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (January 1,
1995) —EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2
2. Carta de Marcos Sobre el Avance del Ejercito Mexicano 
y Descubrimientos de la PGR (February 13, 1994)—EZLN 
Documentos y Comunicados 2
3. Comunicado de Marcos firmado por Ana Maria, David y 
Javier (February 17,1995) EZLN Documentos y 
Comunicados 2
4. Pide no cejar en las movilizaciones por la paz 
(February 27, 1995)—EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2
5. Factores Verde Olivo Motivaron Mi Ausencia (May 11,
1995) —EZLN Documentos y Comunicados 2
6. La Palabra y el Silencio (October 12, 1995)—nuestra 
arma es nuestra palabra
1996
1. Cuarta Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (January 1,
1996) —nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
2. La Guerra contra el pueblo no es la paz que buscamos 
(March 7, 1996)—Ya Basta! Website
3. Hoy, Ochenta y cinco anos mas tarde, la historia se 
repite (April 4, 1996)—nuestra arma es nuestra 
palabra
4. Se retira el EZLN del dialogo... (August 29, 1996)—Ya 
Basta! Website
5. Miente el Gobierno (September 17, 1996)—Ya Basta! Web
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6. La sociedad civil, el concept© incomodo y la realidad 
molesta (October 23, 1996)—nuestra arma es nuestra 
palabra
1997
1. En el tercer aniversario del alzamiento (January 1,
1997) —Ya Basta! Website
2. A un ano de la firma de los acuerdos de San Andres y 
dos de la traicion del supreme gobierno (February 14,
■ 1997)—Ya Basta! Website
3. Carta al Jefe Zapata (April 10, 1997)—Ya Basta! 
Website
4. Se prepara la solucion militar al conflicto 
chiapaneco (November 7, 1997)—Ya Basta! Website
5. Conclusiones del EZLN sobre la masacre (December 26, 
1994)—Ya Basta! Website
1998
1. Saludos a las movilizaciones (January 1998)—Ya Basta! 
Website
2. Mienten las fotos? (January ,5, 1998)—nuestra arma es 
nuestra palabra
3. Para aquellos que protestan con nosotros despues de 
Acteal (January 21, 1998)—nuestra arma es nuestra 
palabra
4. Quinta Declaracion de la Selva Lacandona (July 1998)— 
Ya Basta! Website
5. Aca sigue lloviendo (September 8, 1998)—nuestra arma 
es nuestra palabra
6. Provocaciones militares ante el dialogo (October 27,
1998) —Ya Basta! Website
1999
1. Con motivo del Quinto Aniversario del Levantamiento 
Zapatista (January 1, 1999)—Ya Basta! Website
2. Convocatoria del EZLN a la Consulta Internacional por 
el Reconocimiento de los Derechos de los Pueblos 
Indios y por el fin de la guerra del exterminio 
(January 17, 1999)—Ya Basta! Website
3. Comunicado con motivo del 80 aniversario de la muerte 
del Gral. Emiliano Zapata (April 10, 1999)—Ya Basta! 
Website
4. La digna resistencia de Amador Hernandez (August
1999) —nuestra arma es nuestra palabra
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5. Chiapas: la Guerra (II) la maquina del etnocidio 
(Carta 5.2) (November 1999)—Ya Basta! Website
2000
1. Comunicado del CCRI-CG del EZLN sobre las nuevas 
provocaciones de guerra en la zona de los Altos (May 
10, 2000)—Ya Basta! Website
2. A Zedillo, seis anos despues (November 2000)—nuestra 
arma es nuestra palabra
3. Fox, usted debe saber (December 2, 2000)—nuestra arma 
es nuestra palabra
4 . Comunicado sobre el posible reinicio de negociaciones 
con el gobierno (December 2, 2000)—Ya Basta! Website
5. Comunicado sobre el retiro del Ejercito de Amador 
Hernandez (December 22, 2000)—Ya Basta! Website
2001
1. Celebrando el septimo aniversario del alzamiento 
Zapatista (January 1, 2001)—Ya Basta! Website
2. Nos estamos manifestando (January 12, 2001)—nuestra 
arma es nuestra palabra
3. Aclarando dudas sobre la marcha al DF y las tres 
condiciones para el dialogo (January 27, 2001)—Ya 
Basta! Website
4. Palabras de la delegacion Zapatista en San Cristobal 
de las Casas, Chiapas, en el arranque de la marcha 
por la dignidad (February 24z 2001)—Ya Basta! Website
5. Comunicado del CCRI-CG del EZLN rechazando la 
mutilacion de la "ley indigena" en el congreso (April 
29, 2001)—Ya Basta! Website
2002
1. Marcos Saluda a la revista Zapatista Rebeldia y 
afirma que la practica politica y cultural esta 
plagada de mitos (September 2002)—Ya Basta! Website
2. Marcos pide a ETA tregua unilateral (December 7,
2002)—Ya Basta! Website
3. Carta del EZLN a la sociedad civil Espanola y Vasca; 
aclaracion de la carta leida en noviembre (December 
7, 2002)—Ya Basta! Website
4. En el caso de los puebl-os Zapatistas no Habra 
"desalojo pacifico" (December 29, 2002)—Ya Basta! 
Website
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2003
1. Otro Calendario: el de la resistencia (January 2003) 
Ya Basta! Website
2. Respuesta del EZLN a ETA (January 9, 2003)—Ya Basta! 
Website
3. Comunicado al pueblo de Mexico y a los pueblos del 
mundo (April 4, 2003)—Ya Basta! Website
4. Mundo: Siete Pensamientos en Mayo del 2003 (May
2003) —Frente Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional (FZLN) 
On-line
5. Comunicado del CCRI-CG del EZLN: Cambios en 
funcionamiento interno y en la relacion con la 
Sociedad Civil (July 19, 2003)—Ya Basta! Website
2004
1. En memoria de los Zapatistas caidos (February 14,
2004) —Ya Basta! Website
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Zapatista Quotes: Original Spanish Text
1. "Los dictadores estan aplicando una Guerra genocida 
no declarada contra nuestros pueblos desde hace 
muchos anos, por lo que pedimos tu participacion 
decidida apoyando este plan del pueblo mexicano que 
lucha por trabajo, tierra, techo, alimentacion, 
salud, educacion, independencia, libertad, 
democracia, justicia y paz" (Comandancia General del 
EZLN, 1994, Ponce de Leon (Ed.), p. 15).
2. "Saben que sus ejercitos privados no tienen 
pantalones para enfrentarse a los Zapatistas; ahora 
esperan que el Ejercito federal les haga el trabajo 
que antes hacian ellos sin tanta prensa encima: el 
asesinato masivo" (Subcomandante Marcos, 1995, p.
215) .
3. "Ya antes han intentado exterminarnos. Diversas 
doctrinas, ideas diferentes han sido usadas para 
cubrir de racionalidad el etnocidio" (CCRI- 
Comandancia General del EZLN, Ponce de Leon (Ed.), 
1995, p. 86).
4. "A los Zapatistas, los mas pequenos, los siempre 
olvidados, la carne destinada ayer a la muerte por 
diarrhea-, desnutricion, olvido, en los campos 
cafetaleros, las fincas, las calles, la montana" 
(Subcomandante Marcos, 1995, p. 217).
5. "El proyecto de pais que el poder enarbola con las 
manos ensangrentadas, y con la ley y la legitimidad 
manchadas por la corrupcion y el crimen. El proyecto 
de nacion que significa destruccion, miseria y 
muerte, guerra en todas partes y a todos los niveles" 
(Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos,1996, Ponce de Leon 
(Ed.), 2001, p. 133).
6. "Y a Tlatelolco 68 no solo lo hermana con Acteal 97 
la sangre inocente derr-amada. Tambien entonces, como 
ahora, el gobierno hablaba de dialogo y de paz con 
las manos llenas de muerte" (CCRI-Comandancia General 
del EZLN, Internet, December 26, 1997, 119) .
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7. "Mientras ellos, los que en el poder se esconden, 
expropian la libertad de disidentes e inconformes y 
obsequian impunidad a los verdaderos criminals, los 
que ayer y hoy fueron y son gobierno" (Subcomandante 
Insurgente Marcos, 1996, Ponce de Leon (Ed.), 2001, 
p. 132)
8. "Mientras se faltaba a la palabra empanada, decenas 
de miles de soldados continuaron cercando, hostigando 
y persiguiendo a las comunidades indigenas" (CCRI- 
Comandancia General del EZLN, Internet, February 14, 
1997).
9. "Los paramilitares obtienen su armamento y equipo por 
suministro directo de oficiales del Ejercito federal, 
policias judiciales y, principalmente, por la 
denominada "Seguridad Publica del Estado", el 
gobierno del estado de Chiapas..." (CCRI-Comandancia 
General del EZLN, Internet, December 26, 1997).
10. "La masacre de Acteal fue una matanza y fue 
realizada con alevosia, premeditacion y ventaja" 
(CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, Internet,
December 26, 1997).
11. "No se trata solo de comprar lealtades, es un 
verdadero reclutamiento, una Tleva: para hacer la
. guerra gubernamental contra los indigenas... con 
indigenas" (CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 
Internet, December 26, 1997, 16) .
12. "Nosotros, hombres y mujeres integros y libres, 
estamos conscientes de que la guerra que declaramos 
es una medida ultima pero justa. Los dictadores 
estan aplicando una Guerra genocida no declarada 
contra nuestros pueblos desde hace muchos anos, por 
io que pedimos tu participacion decidida apoyando 
este plan del pueblo mexicano que lucha por trabajo, 
tierra, techo, alimentacion, salud, educacion, 
independencia, libertad, democracia, justicia y paz" 
(Comandancia General de-1 EZLN, 1994, Ponce de Leon 
(Ed.), p. 15).
97
13. "Por tanto, en apego a nuestra Constintucion, 
emitimos la presente al ejercito federal mexicano, 
pilar basico de la dictadura gue padecemos, 
monopolizada por el partido en el poder y encabezada 
por el ejecutivo federal que hoy detenta su jefe 
maximo e ilegitimo, Carlos Salinas de Gortari" 
(Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de Leon 
(Ed.), p. 15).
14. "Pedir la rendicion incondicional de los 
cuarteles enemigos antes de entablar los combates" 
(Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, Ponce de Leon 
(Ed.), 2001, p. 15).
15. "Somos mexicanos y no depondremos ni nuestras 
demandas ni nuestras armas si no son resueltas la 
Democracia, la Libertad y la Justicia para todos" 
(CCRI-Comandancia General del EZLN, 1994, p.47) .
16. "Todos estos hermanos nos piden seguir adelante 
en esta lucha y en este esfuerzo de dialogo para 
tartar de construer un pais pusto y Nuevo" 
(Comandancia General del EZLN, 1996)
17 . "De nuestro lado estan la autoridad moral y la 
razon historica. Del lado del gobierno solo estan la 
fuerza militar y las mentiras' de difunden algunos 
medios de comunicacion" (CCRI-Comandancia General del 
EZLN, 1995, p.337)
18. "... [S]e nos ha negado la preparacion mas 
elemental para asi poder utilizarnos como carne de 
canon y saquear las riquezas de nuestra patria sin 
importarles que estemos muriendo de hambre y 
enfermedades curables..." (Comandancia General del 
EZLN, 1994).
19. "Pore so pensamos que ya no, que ya basta de 
morir de muerte inutil, por eso major pelear para 
cambiar" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 1994).
20. Si morimos, ya no sera con verguenza sino con 
dignidad, como nuestros antepasados" (Subcomandante 
Insurgente Marcos, 1994, p.18).
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21. "Y vimos que es malo morir de pena y dolor, y 
vimos que es malo morir sin haber luchado, vimos que 
teniamos que ganar una muerte digna para que todos 
vivieran, un dia, con bien y razon" (Subcomandante 
Marcos, 1994, p.43).
22. "Mientras habla de una solucion politica y 
legal, sus ejercitos continuan avanzando en la selva 
Lacandona..." (Comandante David, Comandante Felipe, 
Comandante Javier, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 
Mayor Ana Maria, 1995).
23. "A las muestras del Ejercito Zapatista de 
Liberacion Nacional de su disposicion a una salida 
politica al conflicto, el gobierno federal respondio 
con una doble cara: mientras hablaba de paz y 
dialogo, preparaba el brutal golpe military" (C. 
David, C. Javier, Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, M. 
Ana Maria, 1995).
24. "La paz vendra de la mano de la democracia, la 
libertad y la justicia para todos los mexicanos" 
(CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995).
25. "El gobierno tiene el dinero y el poder para que 
haya mucho ruido de paz y el sonido de la Guerra no 
se escuche" (Subcomandante Insurgente Marcos, 2001, 
p.229) .'
26. "Once puntos de nuestro programs de lucha: 
vivienda, tierra, trabajo, alimentacion, salud, 
educacion, justicia, independencia, libertad, 
democracia y paz" (CCRI-CG del EZLN, 1995, p. 188).
27. " 'No cumplimos con todos los los trabajos que 
nos correspondieron', se disculpo unos de ellos. 'No 
sabiamos, estabamos aprendiendo'. Uno por uno, los 
diez consejales salientes y los diez entrants tomaron 
la palabra, la mayoria en tzetzal, y se refirieron a 
sus cargos de salud, educacion, justicia, etcetera" 
(Bellinghausen, 2004).
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